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1 Introduction
Imagine the following basic problem. There is an amount of wealth to be al-
located among individuals, each of whom possesses a capability to transform
wealth into some given valued outcome, and the achievements of individu-
als, with regard to that outcome, are interpersonally comparable. Think,
for instance, of life expectancy as a function of investment in health care,
future earning power as a function of investment in education, etc.
In Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006) we analyze a canonical version
of this problem in which no individual can achieve a positive level of the
outcome without being allocated a positive amount of wealth. Individuals,
however, are typically not only heterogeneous with respect to their capa-
bilities, but also with respect to their initial endowments and/or opportu-
nities. In this paper, we analyze a general model, encompassing the model
in Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006), that also allows for heterogeneity of
initial (outcome) endowments.
In resource allocation problems of this sort, there are usually two focal
points of distribution: to distribute the available resource equally among all
agents, and to distribute the resource among the population so as to equalize
the outcomes among them. If agents differ in their initial endowments, this
latter distribution might not be feasible.1 The corresponding natural sec-
ond best would be to distribute the resource among the population so as to
lexicographically maximize the distribution of outcomes agents achieve after
the allocation. We shall see that these two polar methods can actually be
characterized together by combining several ethical and operational axioms.
Among the former ones, there will be the so-called priority axiom (e.g.,
Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006), which imposes a positive discrimina-
tion (but only to a certain extent) towards the less capable of transforming
resource into outcome; and the so-called resource monotonicity axiom (e.g.,
Roemer, 1986) formalizing the idea of solidarity with respect to changes on
the available wealth. Among the latter ones, there will be the so-called com-
position axiom (e.g., Young, 1988; Moulin, 2000) pertaining to the behavior
of a rule with respect to tentative allocations based on a wrong estimation
of the available wealth; and the consistency axiom (e.g., Thomson 2007) a
principle of stability relating the solution of a given problem to the solu-
tions of the corresponding reduced problems that appear when a subgroup
of agents in the original population leaves with their awards.
1Think, simply, of the case in which only a small amount of wealth is available and
some agents have large initial endowments, whereas most of the other agents have no
initial endowment.
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If the composition axiom is dropped from the characterization result
mentioned above, more egalitarian rules are obtained. More precisely, a
family of rules is obtained in which each rule lexicographically maximizes
the distribution of some general index of resources and outcomes, where the
index is not determined without further assumptions. This is actually a large
class of rules having the focal resource-egalitarian and outcome-egalitarian
rules described above as polar cases in that class, on the ‘conservative’ and
‘radical’ ends and generalizing the corresponding class of rules characterized
in Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006).
Our paper can be considered as part of the fast-expanding literature
on fair allocation. Traditionally, economists have been criticized for paying
too little attention to distributional questions. There now exists, however,
a well-developed literature devoted to the formulation and the analysis of
equity concepts that traces back to Foley (1967) and his notion of envy-free
allocation. In the last few years, a variety of new solutions has been pro-
posed and applied to a wide range of models, and a number of properties
of solutions have been formulated and studied for these models (see, for
instance, Roemer, 1996b; Moulin, 2003; Fleurbaey, 2008; Thomson, forth-
coming; and the literature cited therein). To a large extent, this literature
has been axiomatic, taking as point of departure properties of allocation
rules and investigating the existence of rules satisfying various combinations
of these properties. This is precisely what we do in this paper for a model of
resource allocation in which agents’ capabilities and endowments may differ.
Some of our axioms will reflect equity concerns and others will pertain to
the way solutions respond to changes in some of the data describing the
environment. As we shall see, our work will be a case in point for a broad
notion of egalitarianism.
The use of the axiomatic method is not a discovery of the theory of
fair allocation but of the theory of bargaining initiated by Nash (1950).
Bargaining theory is the axiomatic study of utility-allocating mechanisms
acting on a domain of utility possibility sets with threat points. The appli-
cations of bargaining theory to problems of distributive justice are usually
not supportable, because too much justice-relevant information has been
lost in the specification of the domain. This has motivated the extension
of the theory to economic environments (e.g., Roemer, 1988). Our model
is intimately connected to the resulting (extended) bargaining theory with
economic environments.
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2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
Let I represent a population of agents (a set with an infinite number of
members) who produce an objectively measurable outcome from a resource
called wealth. For each i ∈ I, let fi : R+ → R+ be the individual function
that transforms wealth into the outcome. We assume that, for each i, fi
is continuous, strictly increasing and unbounded. Note that fi(0) denotes
the level of outcome that individual i achieves without being allocated any
wealth whatsoever. We allow for individual heterogeneity by assuming that
these levels (to be interpreted as initial endowments) may differ.2
Denote by F the set of functions satisfying the above properties, i.e.,
F = {f : R+ → R+ : continuous, strictly increasing and such that lim
x→∞ f(x) =∞},
and by F0 the subset of these functions whose graphs emanate from the
origin, i.e.,
F0 = {f ∈ F : f(0) = 0}.
In other words, F0 is the set of outcome functions corresponding to those
agents without initial endowments.
We shall also assume that {fi : i ∈ I} constitutes a covering domain, i.e.,
the graphs of these functions cover the positive orthant.
We say that an individual i is disabled with respect to another individual
j if the former always needs at least the same wealth than the latter one to
reach the same level of the outcome, i.e., if fi ≤ fj . Note that it might well
be the case that two agents cannot be compared in terms of their relative
ability.
Let I be the family of all finite subsets of I. We define an economy
e as a triple (N, f,W ), where N = {i1, i2, ..., in} ∈ I is the set of agents,
f = (fi)i∈N is the profile of their outcome functions (defined as above), and
W ∈ R+ represents the available wealth. The family of all economies is E .
The following two subfamilies of economies are worth defining:
E0 ≡ {e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E : fi ∈ F0 for all i ∈ N},
and
Ec ≡ {e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E : for all i, j ∈ N, either fi ≤ fj or fj ≤ fi}.
2In doing so, we provide an extension of the model in Moreno-Ternero and Roemer
(2006).
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In words, E0 is the subfamily of economies in which agents have no initial
endowments, and Ec is the subfamily of economies in which agents can be
completely ranked according to their relative ability.
An allocation rule is a function R that associates to each economy
e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E a unique point R(e) = (Ri(e))i∈N ∈ Rn+ such that∑
i∈N Ri(e) = W . That is, an allocation rule indicates how to distribute the
wealth available in an economy among its members.
Examples of rules are the following. First, the rule that awards each
agent the same amount:
Resource-Egalitarian rule (ER): ERi(N, f,W ) = Wn .
An alternative to the resource-egalitarian rule is obtained by focusing
on the levels of outcome agents achieve, as opposed to the resources they
receive, and choosing the vector at which these outcome levels are as equal
as possible.
Outcome-Egalitarian rule (EO): EOi(N, f,W ) = max{f−1i (λ) , 0}, where
λ > 0 is chosen so that
∑
i∈N max{f−1i (λ) , 0} = W .
We shall present several characterization results for allocation rules. We
begin by introducing our axiom of priority, which says that no agent can
dominate another agent both in resources and outcome.
Priority (PR). Let e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E and i, j ∈ N be such that Ri(e) <
Rj(e). Then fi(Ri(e)) ≥ fj(Rj(e)).
Note that this axiom (first introduced in Moreno-Ternero and Roemer
(2006)) guarantees that disabled agents receive at least as much wealth
as abler ones. In other words, priority implies the weak equity axiom, in-
troduced by Sen (1973, 1974), and therefore a weak version of anonymity
(usually referred as symmetry) which says that agents that are equally able
are rewarded equally. On the other hand, priority also says that a disabled
person is never resourced to the extent that her outcome level exceeds that
of an able agent.3
Our next axiom says that, when a bad or good shock comes to an econ-
omy, all its members should share in the calamity or windfall. In doing
so, we are capturing an instance of the idea of solidarity. This axiom has
been previously used in related models by Roemer (1986) and Moulin and
3A similar notion to the one conveyed by the priority axiom is formalized in the context
of compensation and responsibility by means of two dual axioms named acknowledged
handicap and acknowledged merit, respectively (e.g., Fleurbaey, 2008).
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Thomson (1988) among others. It is also reminiscent of the monotonicity
axiom in bargaining theory (e.g., Kalai, 1977).
Resource monotonicity (RM). Let e = (N, f,W ) and e′ = (N, f,W ′) ∈ E
be such that W ′ < W . Then Ri(e′) < Ri(e) for all i ∈ N such that Ri(e) > 0
and Ri(e′) = Ri(e) for all i ∈ N such that Ri(e) = 0.
Our next principle, consistency, has played a fundamental role in ax-
iomatic analysis (see, e.g., Thomson (2007) and the literature cited therein).
It says that if a sub-group of two agents secedes with the resource allocated
to it under F then, in the smaller economy, F allocates the resource in
the same way. In that sense, consistency can be interpreted as a notion of
stability.
Consistency (CY). Let e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E . Let N ′ ⊂ N with |N ′| = 2
and e′ = (N ′, f ′,W ′), where f ′ = (fi)i∈N ′ and W ′ =
∑
i∈N ′ Ri(e). Then
Ri(e) = Ri(e′), for all i ∈ N ′.
2.2 A family of rules
We now construct a family of allocation rules encompassing the examples
presented above. To do so, let Φ be the family of all functions ϕ : R2+ →
R+, continuous on its domain and non-decreasing, such that inf{ϕ(x, y)} =
ϕ(0, 0) = 0 and for all (x, y) > (z, t), ϕ(x, y) > ϕ(z, t).
Let ϕ be a function in the class Φ. For all i ∈ I define the function
ψi : R+ → R+ by ψi(w) = ϕ(w, fi(w)) for all w ∈ R+. It is straightforward
to show that, for all i ∈ I, ψi is continuous and strictly increasing. For all
i ∈ I, let φi = (ψi)−1. Then, φi is continuous and strictly increasing. Then,
define the ϕ−egalitarian rule, called Lϕ, by
Lϕi (N, f,W ) = max{φi(ξ), 0}, (1)
where ξ > 0 is chosen so that
∑
i∈N max{φi(ξ), 0} = W . This means that
Lϕ(e) is the wealth allocation that lexicographically maximizes the ϕ-value
across agents in e. Note that, applied in this manner to an agent’s wealth
and outcome, ϕ can be considered to be a generalized index of wealth and
outcome. So the rules just defined leximin a generalized index of wealth
and outcome. We show now that the Lϕ rules actually equalize the index ϕ
when restricted to economies in E0. More precisely,
Lemma 1 For each e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E0 and ϕ ∈ Φ denote x = (xi)i∈N =
Lϕ(e). Then, ϕ(xi, fi(xi)) = ϕ(xj , fj(xj)) for all i, j ∈ N .
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Proof. Let e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E0 and ϕ ∈ Φ be given and denote x =
(xi)i∈N = Lϕ(e). Suppose, by contradiction, that ϕ(xi, fi(xi)) > ϕ(xj , fj(xj))
for some i, j ∈ N . Since inf{ϕ(x, y)} = ϕ(0, 0) = 0, then xi > 0. Thus, by
continuity of ϕ, fi and fj , and taking into account that fi, fj ∈ F0, it follows
that
ϕ(xi − ε, fi(xi − ε)) > ϕ(xj + ε, fj(xj + ε)),
for some ε > 0 sufficiently small. This contradicts the premise that we have
leximinned ϕ.
It is straightforward to show that the resource-egalitarian rule and the
outcome-egalitarian rule belong to the family of rules just described. For-
mally, ER ≡ Lϕ1 , where ϕ1(x, y) = x, and EO ≡ Lϕ2 , where ϕ2(x, y) = y.4
These two rules are the extreme prioritarian rules for the most able and
the least able agents in an economy where agents can be completely ranked
according to their relative ability. More precisely, in such an economy, ER
is the best (worst) prioritarian rule for the ablest (disablest) agent, whereas
EW is the best (worst) prioritarian rule for the disablest (ablest) agent.
Proposition 1 Let e = (N, f,W ) ∈ Ec. Assume that i and j are, respec-
tively, the ablest and disablest agent in e. Then, for all rules (R) satisfying
PR we have the following:
(i) ERi(e) ≥ Ri(e) ≥ EOi(e)
(ii) ERj(e) ≤ Rj(e) ≤ EOj(e)
Proof. Let R be a rule satisfying PR. Let e = (N, f,W ) ∈ Ec and let
i (j) be the ablest (disablest) individual in e. We shall show only (i),
as the proof of (ii) is analogous. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that
ERi(e) < Ri(e). Then, there exists k ∈ N such that ERk(e) > Rk(e).
Since ERk(e) = ERi(e), it follows that Ri(e) > Rk(e), which contradicts
the weak equity axiom, and therefore PR. Similarly, if Ri(e) < EOi(e),
there exists k ∈ N such that EOk(e) < Rk(e). Since fi and fk are strictly
increasing, and fi(0) ≥ fk(0), it follows that fi(Ri(e)) < fi(EOi(e)) ≤
fk(EOk(e)) < fk(Rk(e)). Then, by PR, Ri(e) ≥ Rk(e). However, since
fi ≥ fk and fi is strictly increasing, we have that Ri(e) < Rk(e), which
represents a contradiction.
In particular, Proposition 1 shows that, for all ϕ ∈ Φ and e ∈ Ec,
ERi(e) ≥ Lϕi (e) ≥ EWi(e) and ERj(e) ≤ Lϕj (e) ≤ EWj(e),
4Actually, increasing transformations of ϕ1 and ϕ2 would yield the same rules.
6
where i and j are, respectively, the ablest and disablest agents in e.
We can define a duality relationship between the members of the {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ
family as follows. For each ϕ ∈ Φ, let ϕ∗ be defined as ϕ∗(x, y) = ϕ(y, x).
Then, ϕ∗ ∈ Φ. We define the dual rule of Lϕ as Lϕ∗ . Lϕ and Lϕ∗ are
symmetric with respect to the treatment of resources and outcome. Note
that ER and EW are dual rules.
3 A characterization
We now show in this section that the family {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ is characterized by
the axioms introduced above. Formally,
Theorem 1 The {Lϕ}ϕ∈Φ rules are characterized by RM , PR and CY .
Proof. It is not difficult to show that the Lϕ rules satisfy RM , CY and
PR. Conversely, let R be a rule that satisfies RM , CY and PR.
Let i ∈ I and α ∈ R++ be given. Define E(R, i, α) = {e ∈ E : Ri(e) =
α} and C(R, i, α) = {(a, b) ∈ R2+ : a = Rj(e); b = fj(a) for some e =
(N, f,W ) ∈ E(R, i, α) and j ∈ N}. For ease of notation, let Ĉ(R, i, α) =
C(R, i, α)∩R2++.5 Our aim is to show that the family of curves {C(R, i, α) :
α ∈ R++} is the isoquant map of an appropriate function ϕ ∈ Φ and to
show from here that R = Lϕ.
We show first that any C(R, i, α) is downward sloping, i.e., if (a, b),
(a′, b′) ∈ C(R, i, α) and a′ > a then b′ ≤ b. Suppose, to the contrary,
that b′ > b. By definition, there exist e = (N, f,W ) and e′ = (N ′, f ′,W ′) ∈
E(R, i, α) and j ∈ N, k ∈ N ′ such that (a, b) = (Rj(e), fj(Rj(e))) and
(a′, b′) = (Rk(e′), fk(Rk(e′))). Let ej = ({i, j}, (fi, fj), α + a) and ek =
({i, k}, (fi, fk), α + a′). Then, by CY , R(ej) = (α, a) and R(ek) = (α, a′).
Let e∗ = ({i, j, k}, (fi, fj , fk), α + a + a′). Then, by CY and RM , R(e∗) =
(α, a, a′), which says, in particular, that e∗ ∈ E(R, i, α) andRj(e∗) < Rk(e∗).
Thus, PR implies that fj(Rj(e∗)) ≥ fk(Rk(e∗)). However, our hypothesis
says that b = fj(Rj(e∗)) < fk(Rk(e∗)) = b′, a contradiction.
We show now that {Ĉ(R, i, α) : α ∈ R++} is a collection of disjoint
sets. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists (a, b) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α1) ∩
Ĉ(R, i, α2). Assume, without loss of generality, that α1 > α2 > 0. Let
5Note that, for any α ∈ R++, C(R, i, α) ∩ {x = 0} = ∅, but it might well be the case
that C(R, i, α) ∩ {y = 0} 6= ∅, for some α ∈ R++.
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e1 = (N1, f1, α1) ∈ E(R, i, α1), e2 = (N2, f2, α2) ∈ E(R, i, α2) and j ∈ N1,
k ∈ N2 such that (a, b) = (Rj(e1), fj(Rj(e1))) = (Rk(e2), fk(Rk(e2))). Let
ê1 = ({i, j}, (fi, fj), a + α1) and ê2 = ({i, k}, (fi, fk), a + α2). CY implies
that Ri(ê1) = α1 and Ri(ê2) = α2. By PR and RM , there exists W >
a + α2 for which e˜2 = ({i, k}, (fi, fk),W ) ∈ E(R, i, α1). By RM , applied
to ê2 and e˜2, we know that Rk(e˜2) > Rk(ê2) = a. Therefore, (a, b) <
(Rk(e˜2), fk(Rk(e˜2))) ∈ C(R, i, α1). This contradicts the fact that C(R, i, α1)
is downward sloping.
Next, we show that if α1 > α2 > 0 then Ĉ(R, i, α1) lies above Ĉ(R, i, α2),
i.e.,
(i) For all (a, b) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α2) there exists (a′, b′) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α1) such that
(a, b) < (a′, b′).
(ii) There is no (a′′, b′′) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α2) and (a, b) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α1) such that
(a′′, b′′) < (a, b).
(i) Let (a, b) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α2). Then, there exists j ∈ I such that fj(a) =
b, for which R(e) = (α2, a), where e = ({i, j}, (fi, fj), α2 + a). By PR
and RM , there exists W ∗ > α2 + a for which Ri(e∗) = α1, where e∗ =
({i, j}, (fi, fj),W ∗). Let (a′, b′) = (Rj(e∗), fj(Rj(e∗))). Then, (a′, b′) ∈
Ĉ(R, i, α1). Furthermore, since F satisfies RM and fj is strictly increas-
ing, (a′, b′) > (a, b).
(ii) Let (a, b) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α1). Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists
(a′′, b′′) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α2) such that (a′′, b′′) > (a, b). Then, by (i), there exists
(a′′′, b′′′) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α1) such that (a′′′, b′′′) > (a′′, b′′). Thus, (a′′′, b′′′) > (a, b),
which contradicts the fact that C(R, i, α1) is downward sloping.
Finally, we show that if (0, y) ∈ C(R, i, α) then (0, y′) ∈ C(R, i, α) for
all y′ > y.
Assume, by contradiction, that (0, y) ∈ C(R, i, α) and (0, y′) /∈ C(R, i, α)
for some y′ > y. Let j ∈ I be such that fj(0) = y′ and e = ({i, j}, (fi, fj), α).
Then, R(e) 6= (α, 0). In other words, R(e) = (α−ε, ε), for some ε > 0. Thus,
(ε, fj(ε)) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α − ε). Now, let αε be such that (ε/2, αε) ∈ C(R, i, α).
By downward slopiness, αε ≤ y < y′ < fj(ε). Since Ĉ(R, i, α) lies above
Ĉ(R, i, α− ε), we have a contradiction.
Let i be the identity agent, i.e., i is such that fi(x) = x for all x ∈ R+.
Let (a, b) ∈ R2++. By the assumption of covering domain, there exists j ∈ I
such that f(a) = b. Then, by RM and PR, there exists some W > 0 for
which Rj(e) = a, where e = ({i, j}, (fi, fj),W ). Let α = W −a > 0.6 Then,
6Note that, by PR, the identity agent can never be awarded with zero resources.
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(a, b) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α). By the above, α is unique. Define then ϕ : R2++ → R+
by ϕ(a, b) = α, where α ∈ R++ is the unique number for which (a, b) ∈
Ĉ(R, i, α).
For y ∈ R+, let A(y) = {α ∈ R+ such that (0, y) ∈ C(R, i, α)}. Then,
we extend the domain of ϕ by assuming that,
ϕ(0, y) =
{
0 if A(y) = ∅
sup{A(y)} otherwise
It is straightforward to show that A(0) = ∅, from where it follows that
ϕ(0, 0) = 0 ≤ ϕ(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ R2+.
Let x, x′, y ∈ R++ such that x < x′. If ϕ(x, y) > ϕ(x′, y) then Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(x, y))
lies above Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(x′, y)). In such a case, since (x′, y) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(x′, y)),
there exists (z, t) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(x, y)) such that (x′, y) < (z, t). Then, (z, t) >
(x, y). Since (x, y) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(x, y)), this contradicts that C(R, i, ϕ(x, y))
is downward sloping. Similarly, we show that ϕ(x, y) ≤ ϕ(x, y′) for all
x, y, y′ ∈ R++ such that y < y′.
Let x, y ∈ R++ and assume, by contradiction, that ϕ(0, y) > ϕ(x, y).
Let α̂ = ϕ(0, y). Since C(R, i, α̂) is downward sloping, it follows that either
(x, y) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α̂) or (x, y) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α), for some α > α̂, which would imply
either ϕ(x, y) = α̂ or ϕ(x, y) = α, a contradiction in any case.
Let y < y′ ∈ R++. Then, if (0, y) ∈ C(R, i, α) so does (0, y′). Thus,
ϕ(0, y′) ≥ ϕ(0, y).
Let (x, y), (z, t) ∈ R2++ such that (x, y) > (z, t). By downward slopi-
ness, ϕ(x, y) 6= ϕ(z, t). If ϕ(x, y) < ϕ(z, t) then Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(z, t)) lies above
Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(x, y)). We have, however, that (x, y) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(x, y)), (z, t) ∈
Ĉ(R, i, ϕ(z, t)) and (x, y) > (z, t), which represents a contradiction.
Let y, z, t ∈ R++ such that y < t. As before, by downward slopiness,
ϕ(0, y) 6= ϕ(z, t). Assume, by contradiction, that ϕ(0, y) > ϕ(z, t). Let
α1 = ϕ(0, y) and α2 = ϕ(z, t). Then, (z, t) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α2) and, by downward
slopiness, for some ε > 0, there exists yε ≤ y such that (ε, yε) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α1),
which contradicts the fact that Ĉ(R, i, α1) lies above Ĉ(R, i, α2).
Finally, we show that ϕ is continuous on R2++. Let {(an, bn)} → (a, b) ∈
R2++. We must show that {αn} = {ϕ(an, bn)} → α = ϕ(a, b). If such is not
the case, then there exists a subsequence {αkn} that converges to α 6= α.
We assume that α < α.7 Then, for kn sufficiently large, αkn <
α+α
2 < α,
and therefore, Ĉ(R, i, αkn) lies below Ĉ(R, i,
α+α
2 ) and this one lies below
7The proofs for the cases α < α <∞ and α =∞ are similar.
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Ĉ(R, i, α). In particular, there exists a ball B, about (a, b) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, α)
which lies above Ĉ(R, i, α+α2 ). Since (an, bn) → (a, b), it follows that for
large kn, (akn , bkn) ∈ B. On the other hand, (akn , bkn) ∈ Ĉ(R, i, αkn) which,
for large kn, lies below Ĉ(R, i, α+α2 ). This represents a contradiction. Note
that an analogous argument allows us to show the case in which a = 0 but
(an, bn) ∈ R2++. To conclude, assume that an = a = 0 for all n. If, by
contradiction, there exists a subsequence {αkn} that converges to α 6= α,8
then, for kn sufficiently large, αkn <
α+α
2 < α. Then, (0, bkn) ∈ C(R, i, αkn)
whereas (0, bkn) /∈ C(R, i, α+α2 ). Now, there is an interval centered in (0, b)
which lies within C(R, i, α+α2 ), which implies, by convergence, that (0, bkn) ∈
C(R, i, α+α2 ), a contradiction.
The proof of the theorem concludes by showing that R = Lϕ, i.e.,
R(N, f,W ) = Lϕ(N, f,W ) for all (N, f,W ) ∈ E . Fix e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E .
Let i be the identity agent, i.e., i is such that fi(x) = x for all x ∈ R+. Two
cases are distinguished.
Case 1: i ∈ N . Let λ = Ri(e) > 0. Then, (Rj(e), fj(Rj(e))) ∈ C(R, i, λ)
for all j ∈ N . Thus, ψj(Rj(e)) = λ for all j ∈ N such that Rj(e) > 0 and
ψj(Rj(e)) ≥ λ for all j ∈ N such that Rj(e) = 0. Since
∑
j∈N Rj(e) = W ,
it follows that R(e) = Lϕ(e).
Case 2: i /∈ N . Let j ∈ N be such thatRj(e) > 0 and denote wj = Rj(e).
By PR and RM , there exists wi > 0 such that R(ê) = (wi, wj), where
ê = ({i, j}, (fi, fj), wi +wj). We show that C(R, j, wj) ⊆ C(R, i, wi). To do
so, let (a, b) ∈ C(R, j, wj). Then, there exists l ∈ I such that b = fl(a) and
(wj , a) = (Rj(e2), Rl(e2)), where e2 = ({j, l}, (fj , fl), wj + a). Then, by CY
and RM , R(e3) = (wi, wj , a), where e3 = ({i, j, l}, (fi, fj , fl), wi + wj + a).
Consequently, (a, b) ∈ C(R, i, wi), showing that C(R, j, wj) ⊆ C(R, i, wi).
We now distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 2.1: Rl(e) = 0 for all l ∈ N \{j}. In other words, W = wj . Since
(0, fl(0)) = (Rl(e), fl(Rl(e))) ∈ C(R, j, wj) for all l ∈ N \ {j}, the above
shows that (Rl(e), fl(Rl(e))) ∈ C(R, i, wi) for all l ∈ N . Thus, ψl(0) ≥ wi
for all l ∈ N \{j} and ψj(W ) = wi. From here, the proof of Case 1 concludes
Subcase 2.2: Rk(e) > 0 for some k ∈ N \ {j}. Denote wk = Rk(e) > 0.
As above, by PR and RM , there exists w˜i > 0 such that R(e˜) = (w˜i, wk),
where e˜ = ({i, k}, (fi, fk), w˜i +wk). Analogously to the above argument, we
show that C(R, k,wk) ⊆ C(R, i, w˜i). Thus, it follows that (wj , fj(wj)) ∈
Ĉ(R, i, wi) ∩ Ĉ(R, i, w˜i), which implies that wi = w˜i. Let λ = wi = w˜i.
8We assume, as before, that α < α.
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Then, (Rl(e), fl(Rl(e))) ∈ C(R, i, λ) for all l ∈ N . From here, the proof of
Case 1 concludes.
Lemma 1 shows that Theorem 1 is indeed a generalization of Theorem 1
in Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006), where we show that, for the domain
of economies E0, the family of rules that equalize an index of resources and
outcome levels is characterized by the corresponding axiom of restricted
domain, the axiom of priority and a solidarity axiom (which is equivalent in
that context to the combination of resource monotonicity and consistency).
4 A new axiom and a new characterization
Next, we introduce a property pertaining to the behavior of a rule with re-
spect to tentative allocations based on a wrong estimation of the available
wealth. To motivate this property, imagine the following scenario: after
having committed to divide the available wealth, one finds that the actual
amount to divide is larger than was initially assumed. Then, two options are
open: either the tentative division is cancelled altogether and the allocation
for the actual economy is obtained directly, or we add to the initial com-
mitment the result of applying the rule to the subsequent economy with the
remaining amount and the adjusted individual outcome functions that would
emerge after the initial economies. The requirement of composition is that
both ways of proceeding should result in the same allocations. Formally,
Composition (CP). Let e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E. Let W 1,W 2 ∈ R++ such that
W = W 1 +W 2 and e1 = (N, f,W 1) ∈ E. For each i ∈ N , let f̂i ∈ F be such
that f̂i(x) = fi(x+Ri(e1)) for all x ∈ R+, and let e2 =
(
N,
(
f̂i
)
i∈N
,W 2
)
∈
E. Then, R(e) = R(e1) +R(e2).9
The property of composition has been frequently used in the context of
rationing problems (e.g., Young, 1988; Moulin, 2000). It is also reminis-
cent of the step-by-step negotiations axiom in bargaining (e.g., Kalai, 1977;
Myerson, 1977). Similar notions have also appeared in alternative contexts
(e.g., Laffond et al., 1996; Moulin and Stong, 2002).
It is straightforward to show that ER satisfies CP . We also have the
following.
Proposition 2 EO satisfies CP .
9Note that CP implies a weak version of RM , but not necessarily the strict version we
are using here.
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Proof. Let e = (N, f,W ) ∈ E . Then, for each i ∈ N , EOi(e) =
max{σi (λ) , 0}, where σi = f−1i and λ is such that
∑
i∈N max{σi (λ) , 0} =
W . Assume, without loss of generality, that N = {1, 2, ..., n} and that agents
are ranked (in an increasing order) according to their initial endowments,
i.e., fi (0) ≤ fi+1 (0) for all i = 1, ..., n − 1. Let W 1,W 2 ∈ R++ be such
that W = W 1 + W 2 and let e1 = (N, f,W 1) ∈ E. For each i ∈ N , let
f̂i ∈ F be such that f̂i(x) = fi(x + EOi(e1)) for all x ∈ R+, and let
e2 = (N, f̂ ,W 2) ∈ E , where f̂ = (f̂i)i∈N . Let σ̂i = f̂−1i for each i ∈ N .
Then,
EOi(e) =
{
σi (λ) for all i = 1, . . . , k
0 for all i = k + 1, . . . , n
where λ and k are such that
k∑
i=1
σi (λ) = W , and fk+1 (0) > λ ≥ fk (0) .
Similarly,
EOi(e1) =
{
σi (λ1) for all i = 1, . . . , k1
0 for all i = k1 + 1, . . . , n
where λ1 and k1 are such that
k1∑
i=1
σi (λ1) = W 1, and fk1+1 (0) > λ1 ≥ fk1 (0) .
Thus, note that k ≥ k1 and λ ≥ λ1. Finally,
EOi(e2) =
{
σ̂i (λ2) for all i = 1, . . . , k2
0 for all i = k2 + 1, . . . , n
where λ2 and k2 are such that
k2∑
i=1
σ̂k2 (λ2) = W
2, and f̂k2+1 (0) > λ2 ≥ f̂k2 (0) .
Let y = EO(e) − EO(e1) and z = EO(e2). Let ŷ =
(
f̂i(yi)
)
i∈N
and
ẑ =
(
f̂i(zi)
)
i∈N
. Then, it is straightforward to show that
ŷi =
{
λ for all i = 1, . . . , k
fi(0) for all i = k + 1, . . . , n
12
and
ẑi =
{
λ2 for all i = 1, . . . , k2
f̂i(0) for all i = k2 + 1, . . . , n
We have to show that y = z.10 Note first that, since y is a feasible allocation
for the economy e2, it follows, by definition of EO, that ẑ lexicographically
dominates ŷ. This implies that λ ≤ λ2.11 Thus, k1 ≤ k ≤ k2.12 Then,
yi =

σi (λ)− σi (λ1) for all i = 1, . . . , k1
σi (λ) for all i = k1 + 1, . . . , k
0 for all i = k + 1, . . . , n
and
zi =
{
σ̂i (λ2) for all i = 1, . . . , k2
0 for all i = k2 + 1, . . . , n
Let i = 1, . . . , k1. Then, f̂i(x) = Ri(x + σi (λ1)) for all x ∈ R+. Thus,
σ̂i (x) = σi (x) − σi (λ1) for all x ∈ R+. In particular, σ̂i (λ2) = σi (λ2) −
σi (λ1). Similarly, σ̂i (λ2) = σi (λ2) for all i = k1+1, . . . , k2. Thus, zi ≥ yi for
all i ∈ N . Now, if λ < λ2, we would have W 2 =
∑
i∈N zi >
∑
i∈N yi = W
2,
a contradiction. Thus, it follows that λ = λ2 and, therefore that k = k2,
which implies that y = z, as desired.
Indeed, as the next result shows, ER and EO are characterized by CP ,
when this axiom is combined with the axioms introduced in the previous
sections.
Theorem 2 ER and EO are characterized by RM , PR, CY and CP .
Proof. We already know one implication. In order to prove the converse
one, note that, by Theorem 1, a rule that satisfies RM , PR, CY and CP is
a member of the family of egalitarian rules Lϕ. We show next that no other
rule within this family, different from ER and EO, satisfies CP .
10Note that bfi(0) =  λ1 for all i = 1, . . . , k1fi(0) for all i = k1 + 1, . . . , n
11Note that bz and by have their coordinates increasingly ordered.
12Otherwise, if k1 ≤ k2 < k, let i = k2 + 1 < k. Then, byi = λ and, therefore,
fi(0) ≤ byi ≤ λ2. However, fi(0) = bfi (0) > λ2, a contradiction. Similarly, if k2 < k1 ≤ k,
let i = k2 + 1 < k1 ≤ k. Then, fi(0) ≤ λ and bfi(0) > λ2, which represents a contradiction
too, as bfi(0) = max{λ1, fi(0)} ≤ λ.
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Let ϕ ∈ Φ\{ϕ1, ϕ2}, where ϕ1(x, y) = x and ϕ2(x, y) = y for all (x, y) ∈
R2+.13 Then, there exists (x0, y0) ∈ R2++ such that ϕ(x′0, y0) < ϕ(x0, y0) for
all x′0 < x0. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. ϕ (0, y) > 0 for some y ∈ R+.
Let y1 be such that there exists some δ > 0 for which ϕ (0, y1) =
ϕ (x0 − δ, y0) > 0. Let f1 : R+ → R+ be such that f1(x) = y0x0x for all
x ∈ R+ and f2 : R+ → R+ be such that f2(x) = y0x0x + y1 for all x ∈ R+.
Let ε ∈ R++ be such that ϕ(ε, y0x0 ε) < ϕ (0, y1) and consider the economy
e1 = ({1, 2}, (f1, f2), ε). Then, it is straightforward to show that
Lϕ(e1) = (ε, 0).
For i = 1, 2, define the function ψi : R+ → R+ that determines the
ϕ−value agent i achieves, depending on the wealth she receives, i.e., ψi(w) =
ϕ(w, fi(w)) for all w ∈ R+. Let λ = ψ1(x0) = ϕ(x0, y0) > 0 and W =
ψ−11 (λ) + ψ
−1
2 (λ). Then, it is straightforward to show that
Lϕ(e) =
(
ψ−11 (λ), ψ
−1
2 (λ)
)
.
Finally, let W2 = W − ε > 0.14 For i = 1, 2, let f̂i : R+ → R+ be such that
f̂i(x) = fi(x+L
ϕ
i (e
1)) and consider the economy e2 = ({1, 2}, (f̂1, f̂2),W 2).
For i = 1, 2, let ψˆi : R+ → R+ be such that ψˆi(w) = ϕ(w, f̂i(w)) for all
w ∈ R+. We distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 1.1. Lϕ(e2) = (W2, 0).
If so, Lϕ(e) = Lϕ(e1) + Lϕ(e2) if and only if ψ−12 (λ) = 0, which would
imply ϕ(x0, y0) = λ = ϕ (0, y1) = ϕ (x0 − δ, y0), a contradiction.
Subcase 1.2. Lϕ(e2) =
(
ψˆ−11 (λ
′), ψˆ−12 (λ
′)
)
.
If so, Lϕ(e) = Lϕ(e1) + Lϕ(e2) if and only if ψ−12 (λ) = ψˆ
−1
2 (λ
′) and
ψ−11 (λ) = ε + ψˆ
−1
1 (λ
′). From the former equality, it follows that λ = λ′, as
ψˆ2 ≡ ψ2 is a strictly increasing function. Thus, from the latter equality, it
follows that x0 = ε+ ψˆ−11 (λ), or equivalently, ϕ(x0, y0) = λ = ψˆ1 (x0 − ε) =
ϕ(x0 − ε, f̂1(x0 − ε)) = ϕ(x0 − ε, f1(x0)) = ϕ(x0 − ε, y0), a contradiction.
Case 2. ϕ (0, y) = 0 for all y ∈ R+.
13Actually, increasing transformations of ϕ1 and ϕ2 would yield the same rules. Recall
that Lϕ1 ≡ Lbϕ1 ≡ ER and Lϕ2 ≡ Lbϕ1 ≡ EO, for any bϕi increasing transformation of ϕi
for i = 1, 2.
14Note that ε can be small enough.
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Since ϕ ∈ Φ \ {ϕ1, ϕ2}, we know that there exist δ1, δ2 > 0 such that
ϕ(x0 + δ1, y0 − δ2) = ϕ(x0, y0). It is also straightforward to show that there
exists α > 0 for which ϕ(x0 + δ1 − α, y0 − δ2) 6= ϕ(x0 − α, y0).
Let f1 : R+ → R+ and f2 : R+ → R+ be such that
• f1(x0) = y0
• f2(x0 + δ1) = y0 − δ2
• f1(α) = f2(α)
Let W ∈ R+ be such that W > 2α. Then, consider the economies
e1 = ({1, 2}, (f1, f2), 2α) and e = ({1, 2}, (f1, f2),W ). It is straightforward
to show that
Lϕ(e1) = (α, α),
and
Lϕ(e) =
(
ψ−11 (λ), ψ
−1
2 (λ)
)
,
where λ is such that ψ−11 (λ) + ψ
−1
2 (λ) = W . Equivalently,
Lϕ(e) = (x,W − x) ,
where
ϕ(x, f1(x)) = ϕ(W − x, f2(W − x)). (2)
For i = 1, 2, let f̂i : R+ → R+ be such that f̂i(x) = fi(x + α) and consider
the economy e2 = ({1, 2}, (f̂1, f̂2),W 2), where W 2 = W − 2α. For i = 1, 2,
let ψˆi : R+ → R+ be such that ψˆi(w) = ϕ(w, f̂i(w)) for all w ∈ R+. Then,
Lϕ(e2) =
(
ψˆ−11 (λ
′), ψˆ−12 (λ
′)
)
,
where λ′ is such that ψ−11 (λ
′) + ψ−12 (λ
′) = W 2. Equivalently,
Lϕ(e2) = (y,W − 2α− y) ,
where
ϕ(y, f1(y + α)) = ϕ(W − 2α− y, f2(W − α− y)).
Then, Lϕ(e) = Lϕ(e1) +Lϕ(e2) if and only if α+ y = x. Or, equivalently, if
and only if ψ−11 (λ) = α+ ψˆ
−1
1 (λ
′). If so,
ϕ(x− α, f1(x)) = ϕ(W − x− α, f2(W − x)). (3)
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Now, if W = 2x0 + δ1, then (2) becomes
ϕ(x, f1(x)) = ϕ(2x0 + δ1 − x, f2(2x0 + δ1 − x)),
which implies x = x0.15 Thus, (3) becomes
ϕ(x0 − α, y0) = ϕ(x0 + δ1 − α, y0 − δ2),
which represents a contradiction.16
5 Further insights
We have analyzed a simple distribution problem in which a given amount
of wealth has to be distributed among individuals possessing a capability
to transform wealth into some given valued (interpersonally comparable)
outcome and, possibly, individual (outcome) endowments. For this sim-
ple environment, we have characterized the two focal egalitarian allocation
rules that exist, i.e., the one that allocates the resource equally, and the
one that makes outcome levels as equal as possible. We have shown that
these two focal rules are the only ethical and operational procedures for
allocating wealth, provided we assume that ethical means prioritarian and
solidaristic, and operational means obeying the axioms of composition and
consistency. Our characterization result therefore shows that the combi-
nation of the notions of priority, resource monotonicity, composition, and
consistency is equivalent to a kind of egalitarianism, where the equality in
question is either resources or outcome levels.
We have also shown that if we drop the axiom of composition in the
result just described, then a whole family of egalitarian rules (somehow ly-
ing between the resource-egalitarian rule and the outcome-egalitarian rule)
emerges. More precisely, the combination of the notions of priority, re-
source monotonicity, and consistency is equivalent to a kind of egalitarian-
ism, where the equality in question is now some general index of resources
and outcome levels. This result generalizes the result we obtain in Moreno-
Ternero and Roemer (2006), for a simpler model in which agents are not
allowed to be heterogeneous with respect to their initial endowments.
Discussions in moral philosophy have offered us a wide menu in answer
to the question: equality of what? (e.g., Sen, 1980). In other words, if one
15Recall that ϕ(x0, y0) = ϕ(x0 + δ1, y0 − δ2).
16It is worth noting that this argument requires W = 2x0 + δ1 > 2α. Now, we know
that x0 − α ≥ 0 and x0 + δ1 − α > 0, which guarantees that 2x0 + δ1 > x0 + α ≥ 2α.
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is an egalitarian, what should one wish to equalize? Two well-known (and
polar) theories arise to answer this question: the so-called resource egali-
tarianism and welfare egalitarianism. Our paper somehow builds a bridge
between the two sides upon providing rationale for both egalitarian theories
as well as a combination of them (exemplified by the family of egalitarian
rules we obtain as a result of equalizing, as much as possible, an index of re-
sources and outcome levels). Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that ours
is not a welfarist approach, the approach usually linked to welfare egalitari-
anism and which maintains that the justness of a state should be a function
only of the welfares, or outcomes, of the agents in that state. We take in-
stead a resourcist approach by studying allocation mechanisms defined on
a space of economic environments, where the distribution of resources can
be explicitly defined. In other words, we endorse the view that information
concerning the distribution of goods or resources is in general necessary to
evaluate the justness of a state of the world. As we have seen, this does not
preclude us from obtaining welfare (in our case, outcome) egalitarianism as
a result of combining some (non-welfarist) axioms. In a similar vein, welfare
egalitarianism has also been characterized in models analyzing economic en-
vironments (e.g., Roemer, 1986; Sprumont, 1996; Chen and Maskin, 1999;
Gine´s and Marhuenda, 2000; Maniquet and Sprumont, 2005).17
ln moral and political philosophy, the debate between opportunity or re-
source egalitarians and outcome or welfare egalitarians is between those who
wish to hold people responsible for the choices they make and preferences
they have, after some initial equality has been guaranteed, and those who
wish to hold individuals responsible for nothing about themselves (e.g., Roe-
mer, 1986). A natural extension of the model in this paper would account for
individual effort decisions. As a matter of fact, most (if not all) of the ethi-
cal axioms we use in this work would only be justified for equally-deserving
individuals. The literature on compensation and responsibility, formally ini-
tiated by Bossert (1995) and Fleurbaey (1995) among others, provides us
with an appropriate framework for such a natural extension.18 In its sim-
plest case, this literature deals with the allocation of a given amount of an
external one-dimensional resource (which is not produced) among a group of
individuals whose outcome achievements depend on this resource, but also
on their social background (a characteristic which elicits compensation) and
17Needless to say that welfare egalitarianism has also been characterized in paradigmatic
welfarist theories such as bargaining theory (e.g., Kalai, 1977; Myerson, 1977; Thomson,
1983).
18See Fleurbaey (2008) or Fleurbaey and Maniquet (forthcoming) for recent surveys on
this literature.
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personal effort (a characteristic which does not elicit compensation). In the
parlance of our paper, this could be interpreted as saying that individual
outcome functions would be bivariate functions depending on two variables
reflecting the personal effort of the individual and the amount of the resource
she is allocated. The mappings themselves would incorporate the influence
of social background on individual outcome achievements. Characterizations
of allocation rules for this model exist in the literature (e.g., Fleurbaey, 2008;
Fleurbaey and Maniquet, forthcoming).19 Therefore it would be interesting
to explore whether the translation of our axioms to this context would give
rise to new characterizations.20
Eventually, a theory of distributive justice must, we believe, postulate
a domain of economies in which effort choices by individuals (relating to
education and production), as well as risk preferences and level-comparable
welfare, in a multi-stage model, are described. The present analysis is a far
cry from that goal. Indeed, one difficulty in the work of philosophers is that
they implicitly assume all these attributes of real-world societies in their
theorizing. In any case, it is not risky to say that it would be immensely
difficult to deduce formally a theory of just resource allocation on such a
domain, without postulating unacceptably strong axioms, and so it is not
surprising that the work of political philosophers is tentative and sketchy,
by their own admission.21
19In order to address contexts where, due to incentive constraints, allocation rules cannot
be implemented, attention has also been paid to social ordering functions for this kind of
problems (e.g., Maniquet and Sprumont, 2005; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2006; Valletta,
2007).
20It is worth mentioning that the model we present in this paper can also accommo-
date a more general distribution problem, which could be considered an intermediate case
between our benchmark analysis and the simplest model on compensation and respon-
sibility described above. More precisely, think of the case in which agents achieve an
interpersonally comparable outcome (which could be interpreted as welfare) as a function
of the amount of an external one-dimensional resource they are allocated, called wealth,
and, also, the level of a non-tradeable good, called health, they enjoy. In such a case,
any individual would be described by a trait denoting her level of health and her level
of (allocated) wealth. If the domain of individual traits is endowed with a complete and
natural order, then a function representing this order would allow us to associate with
each agent an individual outcome function indicating the welfare this agent achieves, after
the allocation of wealth takes place. The axioms and results in this paper would carry
over this alternative model.
21Roemer (1996a, Chapter 11) discusses how, when one admits more information into
the description of environments which form the domain of a set of allocation rules, even
stronger universal domain axioms are required to preserve simple characterizations of
specific allocation rules. Indeed, when environments contain a great deal information
about individuals, the required domain axiom becomes incredible. The mathematics is
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A final comment is worth stressing. The literature on fair allocation
has been traditionally opposed in its informational setting to the (polar)
branch of welfare economics dealing with social welfare functions. Whereas
the arguments of the social welfare functions are interpersonally comparable
utilities, most of the models in fair allocation display only individual non-
comparable preferences, and the equity requirements are all formulated in
terms of individual preferences. This is no longer an ubiquitous feature in
this literature, as there are also recent models in fair allocation assuming
interpersonally comparable utilities (e.g., Bossert, 1995; Fleurbaey, 1995;
2008; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, forthcoming), as we do in of this paper.
Nevertheless, the solutions that arise do not necessary involve interpersonal
comparisons of utility, as with the equal-resource rule in our model.22 The
notion of relative disability, and the ensuing axiom of priority we consider,
are formulated in terms of the (interpersonally comparable) outcome levels
that individuals may achieve. In a more general context, such as the liter-
ature on compensation and responsibility described above, disability issues
could be addressed without interpersonally comparable utilities, by means
of ordinal preferences on extended bundles (i.e., external resources and effort
levels). We do not endorse the view that social choice should study exclu-
sively models which assume interpersonal comparability of welfare, although
we think such models are important, especially when we interpret the in-
dividual outcome functions as ones that relate resources consumed to the
degree to which various capabilities, objectively measurable, are realized.
This has been our assumption in this article.
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